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OUR COUNTRY, RIGHT OR WRONG: THE FTC
ACT’S INFLUENCE ON NATIONAL SILOS IN
ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT
Steven S. Nam*
ABSTRACT:
The Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914 (“FTC Act”), a model for
many other countries that set up their own competition agencies, combines
the control afforded by presidential appointment and removal powers over
FTC commissioners with an exceedingly discretionary mandate. This
Article contends that the FTC Act’s outmoded openness to strong
presidential direction, where adapted abroad, has helped detract from
antitrust regulator independence. Even advanced players in the liberal
international economic order such as South Korea have made use of the
United States’ original blueprint for unitary executive-stamped antitrust
enforcement without sharing a long historical evolution of counterbalancing
regulatory norms, e.g. the judicial check that was Humphrey’s Executor v.
United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
Strong executive direction in antitrust enforcement is particularly suited
to capitalist economies helmed by administrations with mercantilist policies,
given their belief that the state and big business must cooperate in the face
of zero-sum international competition. South Korean President Lee MyungBak’s term (2008-2013) serves as an apt recent case study, featuring dirigiste
calibration of antitrust enforcement against a backdrop of global recession.
This Article examines the parallels between the FTC Act and the South
Korean Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act (“MRFTA”) before
scrutinizing the enabled silo-like enforcement patterns of the Korean Fair
Trade Commission under the Lee administration. Increasingly widespread
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erosion of public confidence in free and competitive trade demands a better
understanding of the forces preventing global convergence in antitrust
enforcement, and of their roots.
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We have created, in the Federal Trade Commission, a means of
inquiry and of accommodation in the field of commerce which
ought both to coordinate the enterprises of our traders and
manufacturers and to remove the barriers of misunderstanding and
of a too technical interpretation of the law.
—President Woodrow Wilson, September 19161
[Our companies] are fighting with unfavorable conditions amid
competition in the global economy. To do so, they must be
allowed to escape various regulations. Let’s take just a half step
forward to move beyond the pace of change in the global economy.
—South Korean President Lee Myung-Bak, March 20082
It is clear that, at the beginning of the 21st century, we cannot
afford to operate, to enforce our competition laws, in national or
regional silos. We must not remain isolated from what happens in
other jurisdictions. Even if markets often remain regional or
national in terms of competitive assessment, fostering global
convergence in our legal and economic analysis is essential to
ensuring effectiveness of our enforcement and creating a level
1. PRESIDENT WILSON’S STATE PAPERS AND ADDRESSES 315-316 (Albert Shaw, ed., The
Review of Reviews Co.) (1918).
2. Anti-trust trade commission unveils plan to ease regulations for conglomerates, THE
HANKYOREH (Mar. 29, 2008), http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_business/2787
44.html [https://perma.cc/6AA3-EN4E].
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playing field for businesses across our jurisdictions.
—Joaquín Almunia, Vice-President of the European Commission for
Competition Policy, April 20103
The [U.S.] Agencies do not discriminate in the enforcement of the
antitrust laws on the basis of the nationality of the parties. Nor do
the Agencies employ their statutory authority to further nonantitrust goals.
—The U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade
Commission, April 19954
INTRODUCTION
The International Competition Network’s founding in October 2001,
with the aim of “formulat[ing] proposals for procedural and substantive
convergence” among its stated goals,5 sought to usher in a future with more
cosmopolitan and coherent global antitrust enforcement. Although U.S.
regulatory leadership maintained that “consistently sound antitrust
enforcement policy cannot be defined and decreed for others by the U.S., the
EU, or anyone else,” many countries looked to the U.S. as a role model while
developing their competition regimes.6 It is ironic, then, that to this day a
central obstacle to the aspired international “culture of competition” can be
found in none other than the influence of the U.S.’s own FTC Act. 7
American antitrust priorities around the time of the legislation’s passage
oscillated between tempering trusts and shepherding business to further
national economic strength, all towards the domestic interest. They shaped
a regulatory environment that would reemerge abroad in many later-

3. Cooperation and convergence: competition policy in the 21st century, speech at the
International Competition Network Annual Conference (Apr. 27, 2010) available at
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-10-183_en.htm [https://perma.cc/PKL8-QT5
D].
4. DEP’T OF JUST. & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES FOR
INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS (Apr. 1995), available at https://www.justice.gov/atr/antitrustenforcement-guidelines-international-operations [https://perma.cc/6493-TTDN] (last update
d Aug. 8, 2016).
5. INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION NETWORK, http://www.internationalcompetitionn
etwork.org [https://perma.cc/NB5G-HLQQ] (last visited Oct. 22, 2017).
6. William J. Kolasky, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen. of the Dep’t of Just., U.S. and EU
Competition Policy: Cartels, Mergers, and Beyond, Address Before the Council for the Uni
ted States and Italy Bi-Annual Conference (Jan. 25, 2002), available at https://www.justice
.gov/atr/speech/us-and-eu-competition-policy-cartels-mergers-and-beyond
[https://perma.cc/H4RN-ZT2K] (last visited on Oct. 22, 2017).
7. 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1914).
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developing countries.
The deepening global retreat from internationalism and free market
principles in the present day, with the specter of trade wars looming, is
exacerbated by nationalist competition regimes that are derivative of a U.S.
model predating the modern world economy. Domestic critics of open
markets often overlook the U.S.’s own past vis-à-vis protectionist
governments today. Illiberal or nominally liberal, they walk the kind of
dirigiste path once treaded by the American School through the early
twentieth century.8 In and of itself, pure economic liberalism does not create
biased regulatory forces that imbalance “open door” trade policies; they are
largely the product of politics. An antecedent of today’s national antitrust
silo can be traced back to the U.S. political climate leading up to the FTC
Act’s passage.
Beneath his trustbuster image long perpetuated in mainstream
discourse,9 President Theodore Roosevelt harbored more nuanced beliefs
regarding competition enforcement. They proved consistent with a
nationalistic streak exhibited since the publication of his earliest book, a
naval military history depicting the U.S. as a resourceful underdog.10 During
his presidency, Roosevelt formed the first antitrust-focused office within the
Department of Justice (“DOJ”),11 and a Bureau of Corporations within the
newly established Department of Commerce and Labor.12 He used these two
prototype enforcement agencies as his big sticks for holding accountable
corporations which had better “show that they have a right to exist.”13 Yet
Roosevelt also faulted the Sherman Act’s nascent application for preventing
businesses from working to their potential under modern business

8. See generally MICHAEL LIND, HAMILTON’S REPUBLIC: READINGS IN THE AMERICAN
NATIONALIST TRADITION (1997) (documenting the early manifestations of nationalism
theory).
9. See, e.g., Special Report: The Rise of the Superstars, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 17,
2016, at 3 (painting a picture of Theodor Roosevelt as determined to stop a handful of
corporations from taking control of the American economy).
10. See LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, RESPECTFULLY QUOTED: A DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS
346 (2010) quoted in THEODORE ROOSEVELT, THE NAVAL WAR OF 1812 (1882) (singling out
the U.S. naval war hero Commodore Stephen Decatur for praise). This Article’s title partly
derives from Decatur’s famed if controversial toast: “Our country—in her intercourse with
foreign nations, may she always be in the right, and always successful, right or wrong.” Id.
11. DEP’T OF JUST., HISTORY OF THE ANTITRUST DIVISION, https://www.justice. gov/atr
/history-antitrust-division [https://perma.cc/6ST8-CZEE] (last visited July 29, 2017).
12. FED. TRADE COMM’N, OUR HISTORY, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/our-history
[https://perma.cc/JEY3-ZLSB] (last visited July 29, 2017).
13. Theodore Roosevelt, Special Message (Apr. 27, 1908), in 16 A COMPILATION OF THE
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, 7189, 7193 (James D. Richardson ed., 1927).
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conditions.14 Even the leviathan trusts, after all, were American trusts. He
stressed the importance of protecting the country’s global competitiveness
and voiced his opposition to a blanket prohibition on questionable
combinations and concentration. Instead, he preferred oversight and
control.15 According to the former Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”)
attorney and historian Marc Winerman, Roosevelt wanted to “use a
commission to supplement (or supersede) antitrust,” while the firm “that
‘voluntarily’ accepted its regulation and obeyed [government] orders in good
faith would be shielded from antitrust prosecution.”16 Consistent with
Roosevelt’s regulatory hedging and predilection for strong executive control,
President Woodrow Wilson in 1914 signed into law the Federal Trade
Commission Act (“FTC Act”) that established the FTC. Wilson underscored
14.
The mechanism of modern business is so delicate that extreme care must be taken
not to interfere with it in a spirit of rashness or ignorance. Many of those who
have made it their vocation to denounce the great industrial combinations which
are popularly, although with technical inaccuracy, known as “trusts,” appeal
especially to hatred and fear . . . In facing new industrial conditions, the whole
history of the world shows that legislation will generally be both unwise and
ineffective unless undertaken after calm inquiry and with sober self-restraint.
Much of the legislation directed at the trusts would have been exceedingly
mischievous had it not also been entirely ineffective . . . In dealing with business
interests, for the Government to undertake by crude and ill-considered legislation
to do what may turn out to be bad, would be to incur the risk of such far-reaching
national disaster that it would be preferable to undertake nothing at all
Theodore Roosevelt, 1901 Annual Message to Congress, in 15 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE
PRESIDENTS, 6641, 6647 (James D. Richardson ed., 1917).
15.
There is a widespread conviction in the minds of the American people that the
great corporations known as trusts are in certain of their features and tendencies
hurtful to the general welfare. This springs from no spirit of envy or
uncharitableness, nor lack of pride in the great industrial achievements that have
placed this country at the head of the nations struggling for commercial
supremacy. It does not rest upon a lack of intelligent appreciation of the necessity
of meeting changing and changed conditions of trade with new methods, nor upon
ignorance of the fact that combination of capital in the effort to accomplish great
things is necessary when the world’s progress demands that great things be done.
It is based upon sincere conviction that combination and concentration should be,
not prohibited, but supervised and within reasonable limits controlled; and in my
judgment this conviction is right.
Roosevelt, supra note 14, at 6647, 6648.
16. Marc Winerman, The Origins of the FTC: Concentration, Cooperation, Control, and
Competition, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 24 (2003). See also id. at 3 (“Roosevelt envisioned an
expanded Bureau of Corporations that would rationalize the economy, tame rather than
dissolve the trusts, and accommodate rather than challenge both concentration and interfirm
cooperation. All this would take place under government auspices, and the government’s
ultimate backstop would be direct price regulation.”).
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his desire for the agency to be transparent and accountable to him, with
“powers of guidance and accommodation” meant to relieve “businessmen of
unfounded fears and set them on the road of hopeful and confident
enterprise.”17
There is little evidence to suggest that either presidents or their
legislative allies in the early twentieth century could have foreseen the
ramifications of their formative roles in shaping competition regimes
worldwide. American competition laws, including the FTC Act, came to
serve as a template for foreign governments that freely transplanted many
elements while modifying others. A cognizant DOJ and FTC issued their
Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations in 1995,
stating: “Throughout the world, the importance of antitrust law as a means
to ensure open and free markets, protect consumers, and prevent conduct that
impedes competition is becoming more apparent.”18 But these guidelines do
not paint the full picture. Inspired foreign states modeled their regulatory
regimes after foundations originally shaped under the auspices of Roosevelt
and Wilson, both powerful executives with aforementioned hands-on
preferences in matters of antitrust. At the FTC’s launch, “Wilson
emphasized assistance to business rather than the investigative functions
highlighted in the House or the prosecutorial functions highlighted in the
Senate.”19 The language of the U.S. antitrust laws inevitably allowed leeway
for presidential influence on industry-level economic direction.
All the same, the enforcers of old were watchmen for a U.S. economy
which, then as now, operated within a market economy framework. Many
countries that followed the United States’ regulatory lead have been less
beholden. As the prominent international relations scholar Michael W.
Doyle confirms:
The most striking rates of growth of the post-war period appear to
have been achieved by the semi-planned capitalist economies of
East Asia—Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, Japan, and now
China and India. Indicative planning, capital rationing by parastatal development banks and ministries of finance, managed
trade, and incorporated unions—capitalist syndicalism, not
capitalist libertarianism—seemed to describe the wave of the

17. THE PAPERS OF WOODROW WILSON 129 (Arthur S. Link ed., Princeton U. Press)
(1982). See also ROBERT E. CUSHMAN, THE INDEPENDENT REGULATORY COMMISSIONS 681
(1941) quoted in MARVER H. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT
COMMISSION 110 (2015) (“There is no doubt that Wilson . . . felt that he was entitled to
impress his policies on the independent commissions and to expect their conformity to those
policies.”).
18. DEP’T OF JUST. & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 4.
19. Winerman, supra note 16, at 5.
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capitalist future.20
The close coordination between government and big business common
to state-sponsored capitalist economies is also conducive to mercantilist
thinking and dependent on the incumbent administration’s economic
worldview. Originating from a “historical association with the desire of
nation-states for a trade surplus. . . whether it is labeled economic
nationalism, protectionism,”21 or the like today, mercantilism is
characterized by the subservience of economy to the state and its interests,
and a willingness to give home-grown business enterprises an extra
competitive advantage.22 Thus-inclined governments view international
economic relations as conflicting, zero-sum, and better overseen through
state-private sector coordination than left to wholly free markets.23 Nor is
the mercantilist phenomenon limited to illiberal states that feature stateowned enterprises and other such overtly hybrid forms of corporate
governance. As political leaders continue to promote economic growth and
highlight personal expertise to justify and fortify their democratic
legitimacy, an expansion of governments’ coordination with the private
sector has followed.24 When their major industries face dismal market
conditions, countries inured to “capitalist syndicalism” per Doyle are not
above protectionist adjustments at the expense of their neighbors. Together
with the standard mercantilist strategies of prioritizing exports and frequent

20. Michael W. Doyle, Liberalism and Foreign Policy, in FOREIGN POLICY: THEORIES,
ACTORS, CASES 54, 74 (Steve Smith et al. eds., 2012).
21. Robert Gilpin, The Nature of Political Economy, in INTERNATIONAL POLITICS:
ENDURING CONCEPTS AND CONTEMPORARY ISSUES 273, 281 (Robert J. Art & Robert Jervis
eds., 2000).
22. See, e.g., Spencer W. Walker, The Ambivalence of United States Antitrust Policy
Towards Single-Country Export Cartels, 10 NW. J. INT’L L.& BUS. 98, 100 (1989)
(highlighting the United States’ often protectionist antitrust policy).
23. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Curtis J. Milhaupt, Sovereign Wealth Funds and
Corporate Governance: A Minimalist Response to the New Mercantilism, 60 STAN. L. REV.
1345, 1346 (2008) (“In [new mercantilism], the country is the unit whose value is to be
maximized, with a corresponding increase in the role of the national government as a direct
participant in and coordinator of the effort. . . For the new mercantile capitalism, the
government attempts to ensure that company-level behavior results in country-level
maximization of economic, social, and political benefits.”).
24. See generally Christopher May, GLOBAL CORPORATIONS IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE
(2015) (arguing that corporations significantly impact global governance institutions); see
also, Michael A. Witt, South Korea: Plutocratic State-Led Capitalism Reconfiguring, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ASIAN BUSINESS SYSTEMS 216, 221 (Michael A. Witt & Gordon
Redding eds., 2014) (“The genuine fear that full enforcement of corporate governance reforms
may weaken the competitive power of the chaebol [mega-conglomerates]; given their
importance to the economy—Samsung alone is said to account for about 20 percent of Korean
exports—it seems plausible that prosecutors and politicians will try to avoid the risk of blame
for weakening Korea’s industrial powerhouses.”).
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use of various non-tariff barriers to thwart competitive imports,25 selective
antitrust enforcement offers another tool.
This Article contends that the FTC Act’s outmoded openness to strong
presidential direction, where adapted abroad, has helped detract from
antitrust regulator independence. Even advanced players in the liberal
international economic order such as South Korea have made use of the
United States’ original blueprint for unitary executive-stamped antitrust
enforcement without sharing its long historical evolution of
counterbalancing regulatory norms. Strong executive direction in antitrust
enforcement is particularly suited to capitalist economies helmed by
administrations with mercantilist policies, given their belief that the state and
big business must cooperate in the face of zero-sum international
competition. South Korean President Lee Myung-Bak’s term (2008-2013)
serves as an apt recent case study, featuring dirigiste calibration of antitrust
enforcement against a backdrop of global recession. This Article examines
the parallels between the FTC Act and the South Korean Monopoly
Regulation and Fair Trade Act (“MRFTA”) before scrutinizing the enabled
silo-like enforcement patterns of the Korean Fair Trade Commission under
the Lee administration. Increasingly widespread erosion of public
confidence in free and competitive trade demands a better understanding of
the forces preventing global convergence in antitrust enforcement, and of
their roots.
I.

DEFERENCE IN THE FTC ACT AND ITS MODERN PROGENY

This Section reviews the FTC Act’s language, specifically the
delineated presidential appointment and removal powers with respect to FTC
commissioners, along with the broad discretion and flexibility accorded to
the Commission in its mandate. Also examined is a noteworthy case of these
elements’ transnational adaptation,26 as seen in analogous provisions of the

25. See generally ROBERT GILPIN, GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY: UNDERSTANDING THE
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER (2001) (illustrating that national policies critically shape a
country’s economic affairs).
26. Many of the emergent antitrust laws worldwide in recent decades have been modeled
after their predecessors in the U.S. and the EU. See, e.g., Kolasky:
Let me turn finally to the new International Competition Network (or ICN). The
last decade has seen market principles, deregulation and respect for competitive
forces broadly embraced around the world. Over 90 countries—accounting for
nearly 80 percent of world production (19)—have enacted antitrust laws, and at
least 60 have antitrust merger notification regimes. Many of these laws are
modeled after the U.S. or EU antitrust laws. Now the real work begins. Having
convinced much of the world to structure their national economies around
competition and free markets, we must ensure that antitrust works effectively and
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South Korean MRFTA. While far from carbon copies of the FTC Act, the
MRFTA and numerous other U.S.-inspired foreign competition laws bear its
substantive imprint without necessarily carrying over appurtenant timehonored safeguards—internal and external to the statutory language—
against excessive presidential control over enforcement.
Enacted in 1914 to bolster and clarify the government’s authority to
hold accountable business enterprises that harm or endanger market
competition, the FTC Act is one of three core federal antitrust laws together
with the Sherman and Clayton Acts. The “catch-all” legislation established
the FTC and empowers commissioners to investigate a wide range of
anticompetitive business practices and to penalize culpable companies.27
Section 5 is central to the statute with its prohibition of “unfair methods of
competition in or affecting commerce,” as well as “unfair or deceptive acts
or practices in or affecting commerce.”28 Any violation of U.S. antitrust
laws—including, but not limited to, monopolization under Section 2 of the
Sherman Act and mergers and acquisitions that trigger Section 7 of the
Clayton Act—constitutes a violation of the FTC Act.
South Korea’s government enacted its MRFTA in late 1980 in response
to a business climate wherein monopolists and dominant firms with 70
percent or more market share had come to produce 89 percent of all industrial
goods by 1979.29 In East Asia, the MRFTA was preceded by the Japanese
Antimonopoly Law, which the American Occupation authorities themselves
crafted largely in an attempt to stave off a future resurgence of the megaconglomerate zaibatsu that had sustained the Japanese Empire.30 Although
efficiently to deliver what it promises.
Supra note 6.
27. See, e.g., Eleanor M. Fox, Chairman Miller, the Federal Trade Commission,
Economics, and Rashomon, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 33 (1987).
A commissioner of the Federal Trade Commission serves the combined functions of executive
(prosecutor), legislator (rule maker and policymaker), and jurist. The FTC decides what
complaints should be brought, what appeals should be taken, and when writs of certiorari
should be sought. As a judicial body it sits in judgment on appeals from decisions of the FTC’s
administrative law judges. As an administrative body it promulgates rules by which, as a
judicial body, it has the power to compel compliance.
28. Congress in 1938 amended the Act to also prohibit “unfair or deceptive acts or
practices.” Wheeler-Lea Amendments of Act, ch. 49, § 3, 52 Stat. 111 (1938) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2006)).
29. See MEONGCHO YANG, COMPETITION LAWS OF THE PACIFIC RIM: REPUBLIC OF KOREA
(SOUTH KOREA), 1-1, 1-5 (1991) (demonstrating that the increased business concentration in
the latter half of the 1970s reduced the competitiveness of South Korea’s domestic enterprises
in the international markets and an imbalance in the country’s own national economy).
30. See, e.g., Yi Sang-Seung and Jung Youngjin, A New Kid on the Block: Korean
Competition Law, Policy, and Economics, 3 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 153, 158 (2007).
Historically speaking, competition law began as an Anglo-American institution. In Japan, the
U.S. occupation force, led by General MacArthur, introduced competition law after World
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South Korea’s legal competition framework also received heavy influence
from the U.S., it also diverged in some details, not the least because many
South Korean politicians wanted to expedite the continued advances of their
own country’s mega-conglomerates, the chaebol.31 Fairly unsubtle structural
differences came to increase the clout of the Korean Fair Trade Commission
(“KFTC”) relative to that of its U.S. counterpart while limiting the private
consumer’s voice. Unlike in the U.S. where the FTC shares antitrust
enforcement responsibilities with the DOJ, in South Korea the Prosecutor’s
Office involves itself only when the KFTC refers a matter to it; Korean law
also does not permit antitrust class action lawsuits, nor are private parties
allowed to file for injunctions against alleged MRFTA violations in court.32
In sum, virtually all roads with respect to competition regulation in
South Korea must run through the KFTC,33 whereas the FTC is only one
domestic driver of U.S. antitrust matters. Just as South Korea’s antitrust
enforcement paradigm differs from that of the U.S. despite the latter’s
imprint, so too do those of other countries; the structural impact of
underlying constructivist disparities certainly must be considered when
examining overseas instances of agenda-driven antitrust enforcement. All
the same, widely diffused were the conventions of the FTC Act, which had
been drafted in an era in which the competition agency was neither intended
to be nor expected to become truly independent.

War II, but its main purpose was to dissolve and prevent the resurgence of the zaibatsu, the
family-controlled large conglomerates that financed the Japanese war machine.
31. See, e.g., Danny Abir, Monopoly and Merger Regulation in South Korea and Japan:
A Comparative Analysis, 13 INT’L TAX & BUS. L. 143, 175 (1996).
South Korea and Japan are concerned with the growth of their industries. Judging from the
manner in which antitrust measures are enforced in those countries, lenient application of their
antitrust laws are a means of achieving their objectives. Both countries initially modeled their
antitrust laws after those of the United States. However, unlike in the United States, they have
not placed a lot of weight on enforcing regulations which control monopolies and mergers.
See also infra note 105 and accompanying text.
32. Yi & Jung, supra note 30, at 159. Incidentally, “[d]eveloping countries are
increasingly looking at the KFTC as a potential role model, on the assumption that they lack
institutions needed for the kind of sophisticated antitrust enforcement seen in the United States
or Europe.” Id. at 155.
33. See id. at 160.
[I]t could be argued that the KFTC is currently the single, most important enforcer
of Korean competition law. The KFTC’s quasi-monopoly of enforcement of
Korean competition law is distinct from the U.S. antitrust law, in which various
stakeholders such as individuals and state governments may also initiate actions
to enforce U.S. antitrust law.
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A. The President’s Commissioner Appointment Power
1. Power of Appointment in the FTC Act
The presidential power to appoint FTC commissioners is established in
the opening section of the FTC Act and has remained unmodified since its
inception in 1914. Section 1 provides that:
A commission is created and established, to be known as the
Federal Trade Commission which shall be composed of five
Commissioners, who shall be appointed by the President, by and
with the advice and consent of the Senate. Not more than three of
the Commissioners shall be members of the same political party.
The first Commissioners appointed shall continue in office for
terms of three, four, five, six, and seven years, respectively, from
September 26, 1914, the term of each to be designated by the
President, but their successors shall be appointed for terms of
seven years, except that any person chosen to fill a vacancy shall
be appointed only for the unexpired term of the Commissioner
whom he shall succeed. The President shall choose a chairman
from the Commission’s membership.34
Although this bipartisan, staggered fixed-term appointment clause can
be found duplicated in other United States statutes that established
independent agencies, the FTC Act is one of the earliest instances of the
template’s use.35 The statutory language purposefully aims for an
ideological balance in the FTC’s membership by ensuring that at least two
of five commissioners cannot belong to the same political party as the
President. Requirements of Senate consent and staggered terms are also
meant to prevent excessive partisan influence on the activities of
commissioners. In the case of the United States, the longer a party controls
the presidency, the greater the prospects for sympathetic commissions
aligned with presidential preferences in matters of policy. A two-term
President through the course of eight years can personally appoint the
entirety of a five-member Commission, albeit only over time.
The FTC Act also confers on the President the consequential power to
select a Chairman of the FTC.36 Although the chairperson does not possess
34. 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1914).
35. See, e.g., Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-84 (mandating staggered
appointments). The Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 that created the first independent
agency, the now-defunct Interstate Commerce Commission, preceded the FTC Act in its use
of the commissioner appointment provision. Interstate Commerce Act of 1988 § 11, 2 U.S.C.
285(b) (1989).
36. This provision did not exist in the original version of the statute, but was introduced
with Reorganization Plan No. 8 of 1950, formally designating the Chairman as the FTC’s
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any special formal authority to dominate policymaking, he or she has a
strong say in selecting the issues to be covered by the Commission.37 Thus,
the power to appoint a chair in and of itself renders tenuous any notion of
airtight FTC independence from presidential direction in competition policy
matters. At least one noted administrative law scholar has described the
President’s primary avenue for control over independent agencies as the
appointment of the chairperson.38 The United States judiciary too, has
acknowledged the power as a “lever[] of influence.”39 The FTC Act’s
entrustment of chair appointment to the executive branch eventually would
become a norm among antitrust agencies worldwide.
Recent decades have seen the rise of ample literature questioning the
true autonomy of the United States’ independent agencies, as well as
scholarship on pressure directed towards the FTC from different
administrations and political parties.40 For this Article’s purposes, it is
sufficient to acknowledge that the FTC Act, much of it philosophically
Theodore Roosevelt’s brainchild and further developed under Woodrow
Wilson’s purview,41 did not apportion elsewhere or contain effective dams
against the presidential appointment power.
2. Power of Appointment in the MRFTA (South Korea)
The South Korean MRFTA’s commissioner appointment clause
resembles that of the FTC Act in two fundamental respects—it assigns to the
President the appointment power, as well as the power to select a

executive and administrative head. Reorganization Plan No. 8 of 1950, 15 Fed. Reg. 50,4496
(May 25, 1950) (to be codified at 3 C.F.R. 3175).
37. See Fox, supra note 27, at 33-34.
38. Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and
the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 587–91 (1984).
39. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d 667, 680 (D.C.
Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 2378 (2009).
40. See, e.g., Kirti Datla & Richard L. Revesz, Deconstructing Independent Agencies
(and Executive Agencies), 98 CORNELL L. REV. 769, 842, 812 (2013) (rejecting the “binary
distinction between independent and executive agencies,” and positing that instead, all
agencies should be regarded as executive and seen as falling on a “spectrum from more
independent to less independent.”); Neal Devins & David E. Lewis, Not-So Independent
Agencies: Party Polarization and the Limits of Institutional Design, 88 B.U. L. REV. 459, 461
(2008) (examining the “profound impact of party polarization on presidential control of
independent agencies. . .”); Paul R. Verkuil, Jawboning Administrative Agencies: Ex Parte
Contacts by the White House, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 943 (1980) (noting the various informal
ways that presidents can apply pressure upon independent agencies, e.g. seeking new
legislation from Congress, or removing support from an agency in budget negotiations with
Congress).
41. See generally Winerman, supra note 16.
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chairperson.42 Beyond this shared base, the predisposition to presidential
direction is further consolidated in the MRFTA via a number of
modifications and omissions. First, the legislative consent requirement
found in the FTC Act is omitted. The chair and a vice chair are appointed
by the President at the recommendation of the Prime Minister (a ceremonial
figure selected by the President from within the same party), while the other
commissioners are appointed by the President at the recommendation of the
chairperson.43 Second, the statute caps commissioner terms at three years
and expressly allows for the possibility of a one term renewal per
commissioner.44 Given that South Korean presidents serve a single term of
five years, the MRFTA permits each executive to appoint his or her preferred
commissioners for at least the bulk of a presidential term, and to potentially
switch out his or her own appointees by not renewing their terms. Third, the
MRFTA does not contain a clause mandating a balance of political parties
represented on the Commission.45
Furthermore, the statute’s provision for four non-standing
commissioners — in addition to the chairman, vice-chairman, and three
standing commissioners for a total of nine commissioners46 — enables a
hierarchy as well as promotion prospects, when coupled with presidential
discretion over term renewal. At least one standing commissioner is required
to be present for an official chamber meeting, and standing commissioners
are considered next-in-line surrogates after the chairman and vice-chairman,
in order of their seniority, in the event of contingencies. 47 This setup
generally encourages conformity over maverick behavior on the part of
commissioners who would prefer to exert a larger impact than would be
possible with a single three-year term as a lower-tier commissioner.
In sum, the MRFTA’s drafters incorporated the basic framework of the
FTC Act’s presidential appointment clause while further magnifying the
KFTC’s susceptibility to political influence and oversight from the executive

42. Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act, Act No. 3320, Dec. 31, 1980, art. 37 (S.
Kor.), translated by Korea Legislation Research Institute (2015), [hereinafter “MRFTA”].
43. Id.
44. Id. at art. 39. Commissioner reappointments to the United States FTC also have
occurred, although they are not commonplace. One notable instance involved Republican
President Calvin Coolidge’s reappointment of Commissioner William Humphrey, a fellow
Republican, to a second term that would extend to President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s
presidency. Roosevelt would later attempt to remove Humphrey from his post for political
reasons. See infra note 56 and accompanying text.
45. Id. at art. 41. In this apparent effort to negate the prospect of partisan conflict within
the KFTC, the MRFTA also effectively removes a potential source of pushback against
presidential dictates.
46. Id. at art. 37.
47. Id. at art. 38.
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branch.48 The makeup of the appointment power is such that commissioner
removal by the letter of the MRFTA becomes virtually unnecessary in
practice. The brief three-year terms of commissioners, all of whom may hail
from the same party as the President and eye new bureaucratic or political
postings during a five-year presidential administration, render unlikely any
protracted battles. Hence “voluntary” resignations are more practical for the
parties involved.
B. The President’s Commissioner Removal Power
1. Power of Removal in the FTC Act and Relevant Case Law
Section 1 of the FTC Act provides that “[a]ny Commissioner may be
removed by the President for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in
office.”49 The removal power originates from the U.S. Constitution, which
tasks the President with the duty to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed.”50 The first United States Congress consequently endorsed
plenary presidential power over officers appointed by the President, rejecting
a legislative removal power in favor of the Senate’s advice and consent. 51
Independent agencies including the FTC were later crafted in accordance
with this position.52 The original language of the FTC Act did not clearly
distinguish between at-will and for-cause commissioner removal by the
President, nor did it expressly permit or prohibit the former.
Two decades after the FTC Act’s passage and in a blow to unfettered
executive branch control over FTC commissioners, the Supreme Court
issued the landmark decision of Humphrey’s Executor v. United States.53

48. In stark contrast to 20th century domestic U.S. politics, the South Korean centerright boasted a continuous grip on the presidency and legislature from the country’s postWWII inception until 1998 and 2004, respectively. The drafting of the MRFTA in 1980
occurred within this imbalanced political environment.
49. 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1914).
50. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
51. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 722 (1986) (holding that Congress
unconstitutionally aggrandized its own power by enacting a statute with for cause legislative
removal power of an executive officer, which was a usurpation of executive power).
52. See Steven G. Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE:
PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH 258 (2012) (“The scant legislative history
that does exist suggests that Congress probably did not have a clear idea of the relationship
between the independent agencies and the president. If anything, the legislative history
suggests that Congress regarded the removal provisions in the FTC Act as a check on the
commission’s power, not the president’s, and that Congress thought about the FTC’s
independence in terms of freedom from partisanship rather than freedom from presidential
control.”).
53. 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
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Humphrey’s Executor clipped the presidential removal power by
distinguishing between executive officers that could be removed at will by
the President, and quasi-legislative and/or quasi-judicial officers in whose
case Congress possesses the authority “to fix the period during which they
shall continue in office, and to forbid their removal except for cause in the
meantime.”54 The Court asserted that FTC commissioners belong to the
latter category.55 After President Franklin D. Roosevelt had moved to fire
Commissioner William Humphrey due to Humphrey’s allegedly lukewarm
support for his New Deal policies,56 the Court ruled that FTC commissioners
could not be removed from their posts solely for political reasons, by virtue
of their quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial status.
Humphrey’s Executor remains in force today, although successive
Supreme Court decisions have stressed the fine line between the independent
agency’s autonomy and potential extra-constitutional infringement of the
President’s powers under Article II of the Constitution. In Morrison v.
Olson, the Supreme Court upheld a for-cause removal provision for an
independent counsel performing special investigatory and prosecutorial
functions.57 However, the Morrison court emphasized that this removal
limitation was allowable only because the independent counsel acted in the
narrow, unusual, and limited capacity of investigating the conduct of highranking executive branch officials.58 Moreover, according to the Court, the
limitation on the removal power did not unconstitutionally infringe on the
President’s Article II powers due to the independent counsel’s direct line of
accountability to the President through the Attorney General.59 This carvedout exception came to coexist with the Court’s Bowsher v. Synar decision60
two years prior in 1986, where it had held that the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings
Act was unconstitutional for empowering Congress rather than the President
with the power to terminate the U.S. Comptroller General for inefficiency,
neglect of duty, or malfeasance. Bowsher nonetheless noted that these terms,
identical to those found in the FTC Act, “are very broad and . . . could sustain
removal of a Comptroller General for any number of actual or perceived
transgressions.”61 Per the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of Humphrey’s
54. Id. at 629.
55. Id. at 628.
56. MARIAN C. MCKENNA, FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT AND THE GREAT CONSTITUTIONAL
WAR: THE COURT-PACKING CRISIS OF 1937 96–99 (2002).
57. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
58. Id. at 655.
59. See Id. at 692 (“We do not think that this limitation as it presently stands sufficiently
deprives the President of control over the independent counsel to interfere impermissibly with
his constitutional obligation to ensure the faithful execution of the laws.”).
60. 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
61. Id. at 714.
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Executor, “[t]he power to remove is the power to control,”62 and it further
extrapolated from Bowsher that “the removal power need not be exercised
to exert effective control, [as] the mere existence of removal authority is
likely to influence behavior”63—a reality as applicable to the FTC as it has
been to any independent agency. In the wake of the FDR administration, the
U.S. for its part benefited from a gradual development of regulatory norms
discouraging excessive presidential interference with the FTC, which has
contributed to a lack of removal flashpoints since. Without the luxury of
time to organically foster such conventions, foreign governments inspired by
the FTC Act were left to transplant the legal ambiguity of its removal power,
the likes of which had so bedeviled the American judiciary.
2. Power of Removal in the MRFTA (South Korea)
The KFTC refers to itself as a “quasi-judiciary body,”64 seemingly in
the vein of the U.S. Supreme Court’s recasting of the FTC. Apropos, the
removal clause in the MRFTA appears to forbid at-will presidential removals
of commissioners:
No commissioner shall be removed from office or
decommissioned contrary to his/her intention except in any of the
following cases:
1. Where he/she has been sentenced to imprisonment
without prison labor or severer;
2. Where he/she becomes incapable of performing his/her
duties due to prolonged physical or mental weakness.65
Yet the MRFTA’s removal clause manages to retain the lack of clarity
found in its FTC Act forerunner that had necessitated judicial intervention
against Franklin D. Roosevelt. The statute does not adopt the FTC Act’s
“inefficiency” or “neglect of duty” as causes for removal, substituting
instead “prolonged physical or mental weakness,” yet in so doing, likewise
opens the door to potentially subjective determinations. Additionally, the
removal clause’s reference to “intention” can and has become problematic.
A commissioner may encounter strong presidential pressure to relinquish the
post for any number of reasons, legitimate or superficial—if the
commissioner thereafter seeks a further role in the incumbent administration,
62. Silver v. US Postal Service, 951 F.2d 1033, 1039 (1991).
63. Id.
64. KOREA FAIR TRADE COMMISSION, http://www.ftc.go.kr/eng/index.jsp [https://per
ma.cc/L6UJ-VTVB] (last visited July 29, 2017).
65. MRFTA, Act No. 3320, Dec. 31, 1980, art. 40 (S. Kor.).
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a voluntary resignation becomes the only realistic option.
When coupled with KFTC commissioners’ brief terms limited to three
years and the motivation of promotion and/or term renewal, statute-based
removal proves nearly superfluous to inevitable presidential influence over
the agency. The MRFTA’s drafters ensured that even in the worst case
scenario, the odd commissioner with maverick tendencies could be cycled
out in relatively short order by the President. They hence chose to mirror the
general ambiguity of the FTC Act’s removal clause for the MRFTA, rather
than balking from or further elaborating upon it.
C. Elastic Statutory Language and Purpose
1. Interpretive Latitude in the FTC Act
A dearth of clarity on standards and criteria has been part and parcel of
the FTC Act’s considerable normative influence abroad,66 especially with
respect to areas of regulator discretion in enforcement. Within two years of
the statute’s enactment, President Wilson would confess candidly of the new
FTC: “It is hard to describe the functions of [the] [C]ommission. All I can
say is that it has transformed the Government of the United States from being
an antagonist of business into being a friend of business.”67 While Wilson
may have been referring to the FTC as a shield for business owners against
monopolies and dominant competitors, his inability to easily condense the
mandate of the Commission spoke to its versatility and breadth. The FTC
Act’s purview over any “unfair methods of competition”68 per its Section 5
granted the agency wide berth in pursuing both ongoing and incipient
antitrust violations beyond the Sherman Act’s reach, instead of limiting the
FTC to codified standards and prescriptions for a generally defined set of
antitrust violations. According to Winerman, “then, as now, the agency
combined formal powers to investigate [and] formal powers to prosecute,”
while permitting dialogues “with business to facilitate compliance with the
66. See, e.g., Abir, supra note 31, at 143 (“The success of antitrust regulation in the
United States is a compelling reason why industrial countries adopted legislation dealing with
monopolies and restrictive business agreements.”).
67. Wilson, supra note 17, at 265. Wilson envisioned the FTC as fulfilling a finesse role
that the DOJ could not. See id. at 340-341 (“[A]n attempt was very properly made. . . to
provide tribunals which would distinctly determine what was fair and what was unfair
competition; and to supply the business community, not merely with lawyers in the
Department of Justice who could cry, ‘Stop!’, but with men in such tribunals as the Federal
Trade Commission, who could say, ‘Go on,’ who could warn where things were going wrong
and assist instead of check.”).
68. Winerman, supra note 16, at 68. Before the FTC Act’s passage, Section 5 was
opposed by congressional critics for “the broad discretion they understood the statute to
convey.”
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law (those emphasized by Wilson).”69 As discussed, there existed a strong
predilection in the FTC Act’s originators towards favoring cooperation with
big business over heavy-handed policing and resultant debilitation of the
national economy. The inferred use of discretion prevalent throughout the
statute proved conducive to this aim.
Section 5 proceeds to state that a person, partnership, or corporation
believed culpable of antitrust violations by the FTC will be issued a
complaint and a notice of a hearing if “it shall appear to the Commission that
a proceeding by it in respect thereof would be to the interest of the public.”70
This invocation of the public interest without further elaboration has left
open a sizable margin for interpretive license,71 not the least a presumption
that the public referenced is the domestic public. Certainly the public interest
varies from country to country and is not a fixed concept. Even within a
single domestic polity, different interest groups may be at odds regarding its
intuitive definition. Former FTC Chairman William Kovacic noted that “in
the 1950s and the 1970s, Commission efforts to use Section 5 litigation
elicited strong political backlash from the Congress. The very breadth of
Section 5 creates political risks in its application.”72 Whether manifestations
of checks and balances or politicized affairs, such historical developments
contributed to extralegal U.S. regulatory norms in antitrust enforcement that
foreign competition regimes could not transplant and adapt in the same
manner that they did American competition laws.
Section 5 also states “in determining whether an act or practice is unfair,
the Commission may consider established public policies as evidence,” with
the qualifier that “[s]uch public policy considerations may not serve as a
primary basis for such determination.”73 Befitting the FTC Act’s elastic
mandate, no specific examples of any such public policies are offered.
Furthermore, the FTC may find unlawful only the unfair method of
competition that “causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers
not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition.”74
Without further elaboration on countervailing benefits, the statute cedes to
the Commission the leeway to finesse its responses to complex antitrust
69. Id. at 97.
70. 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1914).
71. Especially during periods of economic upheaval, interpretations of the “interest of
the public” can evolve. See, e.g., Winerman, supra note 16, at 5 (“The Commission’s early
history would soon play out against a new backdrop, as wartime mobilization would
encourage, and to some extent legitimate, unprecedented coordination under government
auspices.”).
72. William E. Kovacic & Marc Winerman, Competition Policy and the Application of
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 929, 943 (2010).
73. 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2006).
74. Id.
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violations. While guidance to fill these descriptive gaps has been supplied
domestically by over a century of successive judicial decisions, alongside
evolving conventions accounting for legislative as well as private sector
interests, most foreign competition regimes lack a comparable array of
participant actors beyond the executive branch.75 When acting in a relative
vacuum of precedent and checks, protectionist administrations abroad
encounter less resistance to their justifications for selective antitrust
enforcement in the name of public policy and/or countervailing national
economic benefits.
Section 5 is not explicit regarding openness to presidential control, but
Section 6 includes direct mention of presidential prerogative: “The
Commission shall also have power. . . [u]pon the direction of the President
or either House of Congress to investigate and report the facts relating to any
alleged violations of the antitrust Acts by any corporation.”76 Wilson was
quick to rely on Section 6,77 and even as the notion of FTC autonomy later
became entrenched in the U.S., this portion of the FTC Act was left unamended. Today, the language easily could be construed overseas as an
affirmation of the FTC’s subservience to the executive branch. In the event
that foreign readers of the Act fail or do not choose to connect the historical
dots, they would be unable to find any undergirding support for agency
independence in Section 5 or 6. Indeed, novel expansions of FTC autonomy
in Section 5 cases still risk political crossfire for “going beyond established
principles of antitrust doctrine—principles set in the resolution of Clayton or
Sherman Act disputes creat[ing] immediate opportunities to scold the
Commission for taking ‘unprecedented’ measures or entering ‘uncharted’
territory,” per Kovacic.78 The originators of the legislation would not have
had it any other way.

75. Divergence in culture also cannot be discounted. In 2015, President Barack Obama
was purported to be the first sitting U.S. president to visit the FTC’s offices since Franklin D.
Roosevelt in 1937. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at the Federal Trade
Commission (Jan. 12, 2015) (transcript available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2015/01/12/remarks-president-federal-trade-commission [https://perma.cc/2CLG-7M
4Q]).
76. 15 U.S.C. § 46(d) (2006).
77. See Calabresi & Yoo, supra note 52, at 259 (“Wilson did not hesitate to use his power
to direct FTC investigations, launching many of the FTC’s major initiatives.”).
78. Kovacic & Winerman, supra note 72, at 943. Kovacic is blunt in his assessment that
“Section 5 is important to the FTC in theory, but efforts to implement it have seen only limited
success in practice. Future efforts to develop Section 5 jurisprudence must account for these
past problems, if the Commission is to attain better results the next time. The Commission
needs to articulate, perhaps through a policy statement prior to litigation, the basis on which
it intends to proceed.” Id. at 950.

NAM_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

9/27/2018 3:21 PM

2017] FTC ACT’S INFLUENCE ON NATIONAL SILOS IN ANTITRUST

229

2. Interpretive Latitude in the MRFTA (South Korea)
The South Korean MRFTA also contains provisions regarding
consideration of the public interest and public policies in determining an
antitrust response. Although they appear to go into more granular detail than
their U.S. precursors, the analogous MRFTA provisions similarly are left
open to broad interpretation and enable extensive discretion in accordance
with the executive branch’s economic goals. Significantly, the MRFTA
exempts certain “unfair collaborative acts” from punishment:
The provisions of paragraph (1) shall not apply, where unfair
collaborative practices are authorized by the Fair Trade
Commission as satisfying the requirements prescribed by
Presidential Decree, and they are conducted for any of the
following purposes:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Industry rationalization;
Research and technology development;
Overcoming of economic depression;
Industrial restructuring;
Rationalization of trade terms and conditions;
Improvement of competitiveness of small and medium
enterprises.79

The referenced Presidential Decree (one of many integrated into the
MRFTA’s supplementary Enforcement Decree) outlines the criteria to
qualify for exemption and exhibits a heavy dependence on KFTC construal.
For instance, with respect to “industry rationalization,” the agency must first
find that “the effect of technical advancement, quality improvement, cost
curtailment, efficiency promotion, etc. by the collaborative act is obvious,”80
in which case it will tolerate the anti-competitive conduct deemed beneficial
to industry, presumably with the public (national) interest in mind. The
KFTC also must deem that “it is difficult to attain the industrial
rationalization through any way, other than the collaborative act,” and that
“the effect of industrial rationalization is greater than that of the restriction
on competition”81—both markedly subjective determinations. The final
criterion echoed the FTC Act’s exemption for unfair methods of competition
where the harms are outweighed by “countervailing benefits to consumers

79. MRFTA, Act No. 3320, Dec. 31, 1980, art. 19 (S. Kor.).
80. Enforcement Decree of the MRFTA, Presidential Decree No. 12979, Apr. 14, 1990,
art. 24-2 (S. Kor.), translated by Korea Legislation Research Institute (2015).
81. Id.
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or to competition,”82 the assessment of which is left to the FTC.
The MRFTA’s requirements for the “overcom[ing of] economic
depression” exemption are even more nebulous. Unfair collaborative acts
can be permitted upon satisfaction of the following conditions:
1. Where the demand for specified goods or services continues
to be reduced for a considerable period, and the supply exceeds
considerably the demand, and where such state is obviously
going to continue in the future;
2. Where the market price of the goods or services remains below
the average production costs for a considerable period;
3. Where a considerable number of enterprises in the business
field might find it difficult to continue business activities due
to economic depression;
4. Where matters as referred to in subparagraphs 1 through 3 are
unable to be overcome through the rationalization of
enterprises.83
The criteria’s qualitative thresholds—over “a considerable period,”
wherein “supply exceeds considerably the demand, and where such state is
obviously going to continue,” and endangerment of a “considerable number
of enterprises”—welcomes discretionary judgment calls on the part of the
KFTC.84 When anticompetitive collaboration is carried out by a group of
domestic companies, not only are foreign competitors harmed in both
domestic and foreign markets, but also gains can come at the expense of all
consumers paying higher prices wherever the advantaged products reach.85
Allowing such behavior for the “overcoming of economic depression”
shelters cartels and advances a selective interpretation of the public interest,
one subsumed under protectionist and potentially mercantilist policy.
The MRFTA also carries over the direct presidential prerogative
preserved by the FTC Act’s Section 686 and replicates it across numerous
sections. The statute is replete with amendments referencing Presidential
Decrees for the terms of general rules, and such is the extent of this
delegating act that Article 3-2 (Prohibition of Abuse of Market-Dominating
Position) expressly states, “[c]ategories or standards for abusive acts shall be
determined by Presidential Decree.”87 Thus, timely executive preferences
may outright dictate novel substantive definitions for illegal anticompetitive
82. 15 U.S.C. § 45(n); see supra note 73 and accompanying text.
83. Enforcement Decree of the MRFTA, art. 25. (S. Kor.).
84. Id.
85. Eleanor M. Fox & Janusz A. Ordover, The Harmonization of Competition and Trade
Law: the Case for Modest Linkages of Law and Limits to Parochial State Action, 19 WORLD
COMPETITION 5, 14-15 (1995).
86. 15 U.S.C. § 46(d); see supra note 76 and accompanying text.
87. MRFTA, Act No. 3320, Dec. 31, 1980, art. 3-2(2) (S. Kor.).
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conduct or modify pre-existing categories and benchmarks. The other
subsections of Article 3-2 hinge on “unreasonably” and “unfairly” abusing a
position of market dominance,88 undefined standards echoing the FTC Act’s
relative flexibility shown towards dominant firms—comprising an approach
that contrasts with those of other major jurisdictions such as the EU to this
day.89 We will next analyze how, under South Korea’s recent Lee MyungBak administration, already amenable competition laws influenced by their
U.S. antecedents90 were distended further to accommodate a strong
executive’s overarching mercantilist policy and a national antitrust silo.
II.

AN ANTITRUST SILO BY EXECUTIVE DESIGN IN SOUTH KOREA

Three developments foreshadowed the direction of Seoul’s competition
regime during Lee Myung-Bak’s presidency from 2008 to 2013. First, a
global financial contagion precipitated by U.S. subprime mortgages spread
to Asian markets beginning in late 2007.91 According to Lee, “[w]hen the
2008 global economic crisis struck, many said that it was the worst crisis to
hit the global economy since the Great Depression of the 1930s . . . It was a
chilling reminder of how fragile our world is . . . .”92 Second, in March 2008
within a month of his February inauguration, Lee (a former chief executive
88. Id.
89. See, e.g., Claire Cain Miller & Mark Scott, Google Settles Its European Antitrust
Case; Critics Remain, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2014, at B1 (“The European Commission has gone
further than the F.T.C. in extracting concessions from Google in large part because European
antitrust law gives more priority to protecting competing companies. United States antitrust
doctrine gives dominant companies more freedom if they can prove they are creating a better
product for consumers, which was a central factor in the F.T.C.’s decision to close its case
without charges.”).
90. Washington for its part has argued that single-country export cartels could
potentially bring innovation and lower prices, arguing against their outright prohibition or
treatment as a per se violation. See Marek Martyniszyn, Export Cartels: Is it Legal to Target
Your Neighbour? Analysis in Light of Recent Case Law, 15 J. INT. ECON. L. 181, 189-190
(2012) (“The USA, who expressly allows export cartels, defended them recognizing an
enabling and efficiency arguments. It pointed to the OECD Recommendation permitting
members to exclude export cartels from cartel enforcement in a transparent manner and
suggested exclusion from a definition of hardcore cartels for agreements having ‘a significant
potential to enhance efficiency.’ They underlined that export cartels may have procompetitive
effects, allowing firms that hitherto did not engage in export activities to do so. Moreover, the
USA claimed that export cartels may bring innovation and lower prices, underlining that their
prohibition or per se treatment would be inappropriate.”).
91. See ANDREW GORDON, A MODERN HISTORY OF JAPAN 336 (2014) (“[T]he American
economy began to crumble under the massive weight of an unsustainable binge of home loans
aggressively and deceptively marketed to millions . . . “); C. H. Park, A Whirlpool of
Historical Controversies in Widening Waters of Cooperation, in CHANGING POWER
RELATIONS IN NORTHEAST ASIA 39, 45 (Marie Soderberg ed., 2011).
92. LEE MYUNG-BAK, THE UNCHARTED PATH 271 (2011).
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of Hyundai Engineering and Construction) explained his vision for
competition regulation under his administration whereby “the [KFTC]
commission should introduce a totally new system. It should support
businesses by easing regulations as much as possible so that all enterprises
can conduct their business well.”93 The KFTC, following lockstep as had the
FTC during the Wilson years, announced that the equity investment limit on
large companies would be eased along with other investment restrictions
through MRFTA and Enforcement Decree revisions at the National
Assembly,94 effectively backtracking from reform of corporate governance;
Lee’s governing Grand National Party held a majority of seats and could
ensure their passage.95 Third, also in March 2008, the KFTC established the
International Cartel Division within its Cartel Bureau to exclusively
investigate international cartels.96
In a paradox of sorts, after Lee took office, he criticized the KFTC for
having adhered to “backward rules” he perceived as unsuitable for the everadvancing global economy.97
Yet his own brand of agency
micromanagement was more suggestive of planned government oversight
over developing economies than liberal economic policy for established
powerhouses such as South Korea.98 Lee’s commissioner appointment and
93. Kim Yon-se, New Legislature to Act on Pro-Chaebol Bills, KOREA TIMES (May 19,
2008, 9:10 PM), http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/special/2009/10/180_24412.html
[https://perma.cc/T4Q3-7F55]. See also Witt, supra note 24, at 221 (describing “the generally
pro-chaebol stance of the current president, Lee Myung-Bak, himself a former chaebol
executive”); Dani Rodrik, The New Mercantilist Challenge, PROJECT SYNDICATE (Jan. 9,
2013), https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/the-return-of-mercantilism-by-danirodrik [https://perma.cc/68HJ-PJA5] (“The mercantilist model can be derided as state
capitalism or cronyism. But when it works, as it has so often in Asia, the model’s
‘government-business collaboration’ or ‘pro-business state’ quickly garners heavy praise.
Lagging economies have not failed to notice that mercantilism can be their friend.”).
94. Kim, supra note 93 (“Designed to make corporate governance structures more
transparent and prevent the concentration of economic power, the investment limit guideline
has been a symbol of regulations on chaebol for the past two decades. But the commission,
which backed the rules during the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun administrations, made
a policy shift after the election. Lee has promised a ‘business-friendly’ administration. . .
Currently, subsidiaries of companies with assets of 2 trillion won or more are prohibited from
making equity investments or offering loan guarantees to each other . . . . The regulator also
said it plans to ease the process for firms to switch into holding companies if they meet the
current requirement of a debt ratio below 200 percent. The agency plans to lift the corporate
debt-ratio requirement, as well as the rule that limits an investor to hold a maximum stake of
5 percent in a non-affiliate firm.”).
95. Id.
96. FTC to take on global cartels, KOREA JOONGANG DAILY (Mar. 4, 2008),
http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/article.aspx?aid=2886934
[https://perma.cc/C9W9-XLE5].
97. Kim, supra note 93.
98. South Korea under Lee Myung-Bak certainly was not the first, nor will it be the last,
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removal powers, coupled with a mostly complaisant KFTC’s broad and
flexible discretion in interpreting the MRFTA clauses relating to public
interest and public policy, lent Lee the kind of regulatory authority wielded
by U.S. presidents a century prior. What followed during his administration
were appointments of acquiescent KFTC chairs, greater tolerance for
anticompetitive conduct by the chaebol, and arbitrary targeting of
competitive foreign companies by the KFTC.
A. De Facto Shuffling of KFTC Chairs at Will
A tumult in global markets with the onset of World War I drove
Woodrow Wilson to largely abandon antitrust regulation for a governmentled marshaling of business, depriving the FTC of any meaningful
independence.99 In turn, it was a worldwide financial meltdown that
emboldened Lee Myung-Bak to issue direct orders on KFTC policy.
According to Lee, “[f]or many Koreans who had vivid memories of the
1997-98 Asian financial crisis, the 2008 global crisis seemed ominous.”100
He aimed to galvanize South Korea’s largest companies in response,
hearkening back to previous presidents who had pushed for a rising tide of
chaebol “national champions” that could supposedly lift all boats of the
domestic economy through their success.101 Seeking to preside over a second
act, Lee stated during a KFTC policy briefing in March 2008:
The FTC has so far made a dent in the market economy and
corporate activities, but I want it to have a new role in this new era.
With all regulations lifted, supervision should be conducted. If
companies are tied one by one, they won’t be able to compete with
[their rivals overseas]. . . . They are fighting with unfavorable
conditions amid competition in the global economy. To do so, they
must be allowed to escape various regulations. Let’s take just a
East Asian state that pursued mercantilist policies. See, e.g., Dani Rodrik, supra note 93 (“[A]
succession of Asian countries managed to grow by leaps and bounds by applying different
variants of mercantilism. Governments in rich countries for the most part looked the other
way while Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and China protected their home markets, appropriated
‘intellectual property,’ subsidized their producers, and managed their currencies.”).
99. See W.H.S. Stevens, What Has the Federal Trade Commission Accomplished?, 15
THE AM. ECON. REV. 625, 636-37 (1925) (discussing the President’s control over the FTC,
which he required to provide numerous government agencies with cost reports on scores of
commodities).
100. LEE, supra note 92, at 271.
101. See Witt, supra note 24, at 217-219 (“While the Korean [developmental] model was
Japanese inspired, . . . [t]he Korean developmental state was much more top-down, especially
in its early days. Business was not a partner, as in Japan, but a subservient tool . . . . Despite
democratization from the 1980s onward, decision-making has remained top down and centred
[sic] on the president.”).
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half step forward to move beyond the pace of change in the global
economy.102
Reminiscent of the FTC Act’s amenability to direct top-down
Wilsonian regulatory policy, the MRFTA accommodated Lee’s steering of
the KFTC, starting with his power to appoint new commissioners when
three-year term expirations gave way to openings at the commencement of
his presidency. He would duly bestow upon his two picks the top posts of
Chairman and Vice-Chairman.103
Lee tapped Baek Yong-Ho, a former university professor and head of a
public policy think tank, as his first Chairman of the KFTC.104 Chairman
Baek initially followed the President’s vision for defanging previously
existing MRFTA provisions105 and in so doing drew an extraordinary rebuke
from former Chairman Kang Cheol-Gyu, who asserted, “The [K]FTC should
focus on market-friendly policies that can curb dominance and monopolies,
but ironically, it unveiled plans for a chaebol-friendly policy.”106 Baek’s
approach typified Seoul’s acutely nationalist economic strategy of the
period. He believed that the global financial crisis had “exposed the
limitations of neoliberalism. . . Korea strictly follows its market economy
principles, although its regulations tend to be more excessive than those of
other advanced nations.”107 Baek in effect argued that residual regulation
unreached by neoliberalist policies—rather than runaway deregulation—had
102. Anti-trust Trade Commission Unveils Plan to Ease Regulations for Conglomerates,
supra note 2.
103. See Kim, supra note 93. (“The [Korean] Fair Trade Commission . . . is likely to see
its status shaken as the nation’s top corporate regulator, as its top posts are filled with figures
who oppose various regulations against enterprises . . . . Baek Yong-ho and Seo Dong-won,
chairman and vice chairman of the commission, respectively, took part in the presidential
transition committee to lay the groundwork for the Lee administration’s fair trade policies.
Under Lee’s guidelines . . . Baek and Seo played a leading role in setting the keynote of fair
trade policies, typified by the abolition of various regulations on chaebol, or family-controlled
conglomerates. Baek, an ardent advocate for abolition of the equity investment ceiling system,
expressed negative views about introducing alternative measures to the regulation.
‘Regulations only create more regulations,’ he said.”).
104. University at Albany Alumni to be Honored May 3 for Contributions, UNIVERSITY
AT ALBANY: NEWS CENTER, http://www.albany.edu/news/50061.php?WT.svl=headline
[https://perma.cc/L66J-DNBW] (last visited Oct. 15, 2017).
105. See Kim, supra note 93. The MRFTA’s substantial Article 10 (Ceiling on Total
Amount of Shareholding in Other Domestic Companies) was deleted altogether in the March
2009 amended version during the Lee Myung-Bak administration. MRFTA, Act No. 9554,
Mar. 25, 2009 (S. Kor.). For Article 10’s text, see MRFTA, Act No. 8666, Oct. 17, 2007 (S.
Kor.).
106. Anti-trust Trade Commission Unveils Plan to Ease Regulations for Conglomerates,
supra note 2.
107. FTC Head: Excessive Market Regulation in Korea, KBS WORLD RADIO (Oct. 31,
2008), http://rki.kbs.co.kr/english/news/news_Ec_detail.htm?No=58732&id=Ec [https://per
ma. cc/6HWH-CP2U].
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led to worldwide crisis, and advocated a return to unconstrained growth. Per
the economist James Riedel, a main contribution of South Korea’s leaders to
the country’s postwar economic ascendance had been “principally in
removing the obstacles to growth which they themselves put there in the first
place.”108 While doing so, they could “anticipate and offset the market
distortions that result[ed] from dirigiste strategies of industrialization”109 that
protected Korean industries during their early development. Lee MyungBak did not possess the absolute sway over economic policy enjoyed by
certain of his more authoritarian predecessors, but the MRFTA was not
averse to his virtual control over competition policy.
An opportunity to test the extent to which the MRFTA’s appointment
and removal powers would bend for Lee emerged ahead of schedule, in ad
hoc fashion. Chairman Baek criticized the chaebols’ desire for a “poison
pill” takeover defense and a dual-class stock system in an October 2008
interview with a major left-leaning Korean newspaper, stating that it was
contradictory for them to “want deregulation on the one hand, while
demanding protection of management rights on the other.”110 Baek’s
outspoken stance appeared at odds with that of the pro-chaebol Lee—given
“the wave of business-friendly and deregulatory measures sweeping the
government since the inauguration of the Lee Myung-Bak administration, it
seem[ed] unusual for a government agency to put the brakes on a demand
from conglomerates.”111 Baek proceeded to publicly warn against
government policy that would coddle chaebol to the detriment of an efficient
free market:
A company’s access to the market, [self-liquidation], spin-off or
acquisition of other companies should be permitted along with the
organic evolution of the market . . . Corporate takeovers are no
doubt necessary for the development of the market economy . . .
The market can develop only if companies that experience
management failures feel the threat of losing their management
rights. Having the government intervene to protect their
management rights would undermine market efficiency.112
Within eight months of Baek’s stand and after hardly a year of his threeyear KFTC commissioner term had passed, he “unexpectedly” resigned from

108. James Riedel, Economic Development in East Asia: Doing What Comes Naturally?,
in ACHIEVING INDUSTRIALIZATION IN EAST ASIA 1, 36 (Helen Hughes ed., 1988).
109. Id. at 37.
110. Fair Trade Commission voices opposition to takeover defense mechanisms, THE
HANKYOREH, (Oct. 8, 2008), http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_business/314
710.html [https://perma.cc/MAE4-88JV].
111. Id.
112. Id.

NAM_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

236

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

9/27/2018 3:21 PM

[Vol. 20.1

his post in June 2009 to head the National Tax Service.113
None of the MRFTA’s requirements to remove a commissioner for
cause had been met. Lee instead managed to circumvent the removal clause
thanks to the same implicit power dynamic enabled by the FTC Act that the
U.S. Ninth Circuit had succinctly summarized—the power to remove is the
power to control, and the removal power need not be exercised to exert
effective control as its mere existence likely influences behavior.114 Baek’s
sudden resignation only to move on to the National Tax Service implied that
Lee had a hand in the matter, and had Baek resisted, he risked non-renewal
of his commissioner term followed by ejection from government service.
The “voluntary” departure was indicative of Lee’s ability to shuffle KFTC
leadership at will, a path made simpler in the absence of a Humphrey’s
Executor type of check. Regarding Baek’s replacement, Dr. Chung Ho-Yul,
South Korea’s largest law firm discerned that he had not been tapped from
the KFTC’s internal pool of candidates; it also opined that Chung’s prior
service “as an adviser for the current administration’s fair trade policies
makes it likely that the administration will be able to continue its efforts to
revitalize the economy by loosening corporate regulations.”115 Yet the
elasticity of the MRFTA’s stated appointment and removal powers was
underscored when Lee again made a mid-stream chairman switch in January
2011 after a brief 18-month tenure for Chung, bringing in economic policy
specialist Kim Dong-Soo to take over for the remainder of his presidency.116
The FTC Act’s textual ambivalence towards agency independence yielded
few guideposts for its foreign derivatives in these circumstances. The de
facto at-will, activist calibrations of KFTC leadership by Lee facilitated a
South Korean national silo in antitrust enforcement.
B. Lenient Domestic Enforcement for the Mega-Conglomerate
113. KFTC Leader Resigns, GLOBAL COMPETITION REV.: GCR ALERTS, (June 23, 2009)
http://globalcompetitionreview.com/news/article/16214/kftc-leader-resigns
[https://perma.cc/FC9L-N4NW] (“Yong-Ho Baek, head of Korea’s Fair Trade Commission,
has unexpectedly resigned to take up an appointment at the National Tax Service”).
114. See Silver v. US Postal Service, supra note 62 at 1039, and accompanying text
(discussing how the removal power influences behavior through subservience, indicated by
the lack of independence.).
115. Korea Fair Trade Commission Appoints New Chairman, KIM & CHANG: NEWS &
UPDATES (Jul. 30, 2009), http://www.kimchang.com/UserFiles/files/NewsandUpdates-Kor
eanCompetitionLawandPolicy(090730).pdf [https://perma.cc/4RFM-AB8A]. Chung in a
press interview “emphasized that the KFTC must focus its policies on creating a market
economy that is up to global standards, and added that the Commission needs to be able to
smoothly mediate possible conflicts between governmental industrial policies and antitrust
law.” Id.
116. Pres. Lee conducts reshuffle of Cabinet, presidential office, THE DONG-A ILBO (Jan.
1, 2011), http://english.donga.com/List/3/all/26/400329/1 [https://perma.cc/V324-L9BJ].
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National Champions
The FTC Act’s called-for consideration of the public interest prior to
initiation of a proceeding and the MRFTA’s tolerance of unfair collaborative
acts conducted in the public interest, e.g. for the overcoming of economic
depression, reflect the same root concept: antitrust enforcement, or a
purposeful lack thereof, as a governmental means to societal ends. Within
numerous countries, including South Korea, where some semblance of
“corporatocracy” is condoned by the government, the common denominator
of the public interest with respect to competition policy does not necessarily
equate to lower consumer prices. Great expectations for national champions
and the trickle-down benefits of their success in international competition
can and have overshadowed immediate regard for domestic consumer
welfare.117 Mercantilist directives only exacerbate the overriding focus on
top-heavy economic growth. Whereas the consumer is paramount in the
liberal economic model, mercantilists are more concerned with the
production side,118 an inclination which explains their typical reticence
toward strong antitrust policies.
The writing had already been on the wall for Seoul’s new regulatory
direction with Chairman Baek’s appointment and his ensuing pro-business
announcements at President Lee’s behest, and it gained momentum as the
worldwide recession worsened.
In January 2009, Baek made an
unprecedented declaration that the MRFTA’s exemptions in the public

117. See HWANG LEE, DEVELOPMENT OF COMPETITION LAWS IN KOREA 16 (ERIA
Discussion Paper Series, 2015) (“The importance of national champions (that may be able to
spread positive effect[s] on the domestic economy) and international competitiveness have
been emphasi[z]ed in many Asian countries, including Korea, in this age of global
competition. While such theories have valid aspects, from a competition policy perspective,
they can be dangerous. It is doubtful whether a national champion that is created and grown
without active competition is sustainable in the long run. If domestic consumer welfare is
sacrificed in pursuit of industrial policies, the benefits and disadvantages must be closely
evaluated and compared. In Korea, recent studies show that the trickle-down effect of large
conglomerates has drastically decreased and that the benefit of growth largely remains within
large conglomerates. Hence, the effects of industrial policies differ in each stage of economic
development, and the countermeasures need to change along with them.”). See also generally
LI-WEN LIN & CURTIS J. MILHAUPT, We are the (National) Champions: Understanding the
Mechanisms of State Capitalism in China, 65 STAN. L. REV. 697, 746 (2013) (“[N]ational
champions represent much more than a purely financial investment for the party-state.
SASAC, as the organizational manifestation of the party-state in its role as controlling
shareholder, seeks to maximize a range of benefits extending from state revenues to
technological prowess and from soft power abroad to regime survival at home . . . Of course,
the country’s interests are defined by and consistent with the interests of the managerial elites
that play key roles in the operation and evolution of the system.”).
118. See, e.g., Rodrik, supra note 93 (stating that mercantilists rely on a “sound
production structure”).

NAM_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

238

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

9/27/2018 3:21 PM

[Vol. 20.1

interest for certain “unfair collaborative acts” were in effect despite none
having been explicitly granted up until that point; global law firms jumped
to report the news and its transnational implications for their practices. 119
This regulatory green light further empowered chaebol, many of which
already featured questionable corporate governance mechanisms such as
pyramidal share ownership. According to the 2008 annual KFTC report on
owner share structure, the controlling families of the 28 largest privately
owned South Korean conglomerates held, on average, 49.3 percent of voting
rights but only 14.2 percent of the stock.120 2008 was both the year of
President Lee’s inauguration and the report’s final year of publication; KFTC
compilations of data readily usable by chaebol critics did not serve the Lee
administration’s interests.
International as well as domestic media outlets, on the other hand,
proceeded to highlight recurring patterns of Seoul’s generosity toward the
mega-conglomerates in antitrust enforcement matters. In February 2012,
The Economist reported that the KFTC had “detected over 3,500 cases of
price-fixing in 2010, but only 66 led to fines. The average penalty amounted
to just 2.3% of unfairly earned revenue.”121 While major chaebol Samsung
and LG were targeted for fixing the prices of notebook PCs and flat-screen
TVs from June 2008 to September 2009, Samsung received a scant $23
million fine while LG’s lesser penalty was waived under the KFTC’s
leniency program; incidentally, it was the third time in a two-year span that
both conglomerates had chosen to price-fix and risk a regulator response.122
According to a follow-up report from late 2012, “chaebol engaged in more
than two-thirds of 76 business categories in South Korea . . . Between
January and June, the operating profits of the ten accounted for more than
70% of the profits of all the companies listed on the Korea Exchange.”123 In

119. See Shinya Watanabe & Peter J. Wang, Antitrust Alert: Korea Considers Antitrust
Exemptions for Certain Cartels to Assist Economic Recovery, JONES DAY (Jan. 2009),
http://www.jonesday.com/antitrust-alert—korea-considers-antitrust-exemptions-for-certaincartels-to-assist-economic-recovery-01-05-2009/ [https://perma.cc/R8RZ-5H8Q] (“In an
effort to aid the country’s recovery from economic crisis, the Chairman of the Korea Fair
Trade Commission (KFTC) reportedly has announced that the KFTC may invoke its power
to exempt certain cartels from the Korea antitrust laws, so long as the cartels do not engage
in ‘direct price fixing.’ The Korea Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act (MRFTA) and
a Presidential Decree have authorized such exemptions, but so far none [have ever] been
granted . . . Nevertheless, such exemptions would protect cartel members from liability only
under Korean law. Therefore, the risk of antitrust liability elsewhere remains—including civil
and criminal liability in the United States.”).
120. Witt, supra note 24, at 220.
121. Let Them Eat Cake; Bakers and Chaebol in South Korea, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 4,
2012 at 71.
122. Id.
123. Bashing the Big Guys; Presidential Politics in South Korea, THE ECONOMIST, Oct.
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2011, the major national newspaper Hankook Ilbo stated that the agency was
“quickly developing an ‘all bark and no bite’ reputation.”124 From January
2011 to September 2014, the KFTC successfully pursued a single case of
abuse of market dominance that resulted in corrective orders and fines,
compared to thirty-eight successful cases in 2007.125
The MRFTA’s elastic mandate, as exhibited in its arbitrary exemptions
for “unfair collaborative acts” deemed to further the public interest, did not
impede these lax enforcement patterns. Nor could non-governmental actors
exert meaningful pushback beyond drawing attention to the trend.126 In a
familiar narrative for state-sponsored capitalist economies, top-down
economic oversight absent polycentric consultation and consensus-building
marginalized the input of a normally vibrant Korean civil society.127 The
chaebol enjoyed a mercantilist focus on the “peculiar economic interests” of
elites and social subgroups that could benefit the nation-state’s
macroeconomic performance—a far cry from liberalism’s traditional
emphasis on the individual, and global welfare by extension.128 Subsumed
under Lee’s pro-chaebol agenda, the KFTC proved as rudderless as the
deferential early incarnations of the FTC.
13, 2012 at 49.
124. Kim Yoo-chul, FTC Chief Acts as if Twain’s Man with Hammer, THE KOREA TIMES
(Nov. 21, 2011), http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/opinon/2016/05/264_99184.html
[https://perma.cc/J9DH-8E7C].
125. Hwang Lee, Overview of Current Antitrust Enforcement in Korea, COMPETITION
POL’Y INT’L (Sept. 12, 2014), https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/assets/
Uploads/AsiaSept2014-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/M3VP-KQHW] (“Since the 2009 Qualcomm
and Intel cases that involved loyalty rebate practices, we haven’t seen many notable cases of
abuse of market dominance. In fact, since 2011 until today, the KFTC has been successful in
only one case about hindering kiwi fruit distribution to impose corrective orders and fines of
half a million USD. This is a dramatic decline compared to the 38 successful cases pursued
in the sole year of 2007. Many experts are concerned with this trend pointing [out] that it may
undermine the reputation of the KFTC as the guard of sound market competition.”).
126. See, e.g., Anti-trust Trade Commission Unveils Plan to Ease Regulations for
Conglomerates, supra note 2 (“In response, a civic organization accused the FTC of virtually
giving up its role as the ‘guardian of the market economy’ to focus on the corporate-friendly
policies of the administration of President Lee Myung-Bak . . . Kim Jin-bang, a senior activist
with the People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy and a professor at Inha University,
blamed the FTC for ‘Its plan to ease regulations, despite a lack of plans for supervisions and
punishments, which shows that (the FTC) may sit idly by if the market collapses.’ ”).
127. See Witt, supra note 24, at 219 (stating that the large conglomerates comprise “the
major non-state actor[s] in economic policy-making.”). Though meaningful “civil regulation”
of conglomerates has yet to coalesce in East Asian states such as South Korea and Japan, it
may be latent given the historical potency of “people power” in their national politics. See
generally Kyu Hyun Kim, The Age of Visions and Arguments: Parliamentarianism and the
National Public Sphere in Early Meiji Japan (2007); Kuk Cho, Transitional Justice in Korea:
Legally Coping with Past Wrongs after Democratization, 16 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 579
(2007).
128. See Gilpin, supra note 21, at 283.
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C. Regulator Bias against Foreign Firms and Competitors
The U.S.’ rise atop the liberal international order coincided with Great
Britain’s early twentieth century decline, but also was precipitated by a
culture of free investment that resisted strong financial institutional sway and
social democratic interferences in the public firm. The Gilded Age’s
exponential industrial expansion, dependent on a small number of powerful
trusts, gave way to large public firms with diffuse ownership and frequent
differences in opinion between shareholders and managers.129 Their eventual
prevalence and sophistication largely spared U.S. antitrust regulators of
concerns over the national economic consequences that discrete enforcement
action or inaction against any one firm might trigger. In contrast,
competition authorities in countries that were slower to industrialize and/or
operate within a more coordinated variety of capitalism have had to contend
with the national ramifications of penalizing national champions, many of
them controlled by dominant families. Mercantilist political pressures can
further obfuscate regulator responsibilities within the interdependent global
economy.130 Per Gilpin:
Nation-states are induced to enter the international system because
of the promise of more rapid growth; greater benefits can be had
than could be obtained by autarky or a fragmentation of the world
economy. The historical record suggests, however, that the
existence of mutual economic benefits is not always enough to
induce nations to pay the costs of a market system or to forgo
opportunities of advancing their own interests at the expense of
others. There is always the danger that a nation may pursue certain
short-range policies. . . . in order to maximize its own gains at the
expense of the system as a whole.131
The KFTC’s 2007-2009 investigation into the U.S. semiconductor and
telecommunications firm Qualcomm for abuse of market dominance132—
129. See generally Mark J. Roe, Political Preconditions to Separating Ownership from
Corporate Control, 53 STAN. L. REV. 539 (2000) (describing how the political environment
of the United States encouraged the rise of public firms in the early twentieth century).
130.
The mercantilist model can be derided as state capitalism or cronyism. But when
it works, as it has so often in Asia, the model’s ‘government-business
collaboration’ or ‘pro-business state’ quickly garners heavy praise. . . . Even in
Britain, classical liberalism arrived only in the mid-nineteenth century — that is,
after the country had become the world’s dominant industrial power.
Rodrik, supra note 93.
131. Gilpin, supra note 21, at 290.
132. For an English-language official summary of the resultant KFTC decision, see
generally KOREAN FAIR TRADE COMM’N [KFTC], DECISION NO. 2009-281, QUALCOMM’S
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which culminated in a then-record agency fine of $208 million for a single
company133—exemplified the workings of the Lee Myung-Bak
administration’s short-range antitrust policy at the free market’s expense.
The KFTC concluded in July 2009 that Qualcomm had violated Korean law
by charging discriminatorily higher royalties for usage of non-Qualcomm
chips by mobile handset makers that had been licensed its technology,
implementing discounts and rebates towards purchase of its CDMA chipsets,
and continuing to require 50 percent royalty payments following the
expiration of licensed patents.134 However, Qualcomm’s licensing deals had
long been public knowledge, as was the company’s preferential treatment of
certain licensees, such as Nokia, which received special terms in 2008 as part
of a new agreement.135 The KFTC itself pointed out that “Qualcomm was
able to maintain its high market share close to a monopoly for more than a
decade.”136 Hence the timing of the agency’s hammer, given longstanding
public knowledge of Qualcomm’s marketing practices and its 98 percent
market share of the Korean CDMA modem chip market since 2002, attracted
due criticism.
The MRFTA was a willing straw man in its latitude with respect to
presidential determination of categories and standards for abusive marketdominating acts, and its imprecise statutory guidance suited the KFTC. The
agency found market dominance abuse under Section 3-2, specifically “acts
of unreasonably interfering with business activities of other entrepreneurs”
and “acts of unfairly excluding competing entrepreneurs,” as well as unfair
business practices under Section 23 (“acts of unfairly taking advantage of its
position in the business area”).137 In assessing the applicability of these
ABUSE OF DOMINANCE (2012) http://www.ftc.go.kr/eng/bbs.do?command=getList&typ
e_cd=54&pageId=0302 [https://perma.cc/8LVC-4Z7R] (explaining Qualcomm corporation’s
anti-competitive behaviors and analyzing the commission’s decision on the case).
133. Id. at 23. See also S. Korea fines Qualcomm $208 mln in anti-trust case, REUTERS
(Jul. 23, 2009), http://www.reuters.com/article/qualcomm-korea/update-2-s-korea-finesqualcomm-208-mln-in-anti-trust-case-idUSSEO19318620090723 [https://perma.cc/55ZM96WA].
134. Id. at 1.
135. Scott Moritz, Qualcomm plays favorites with Nokia, FORTUNE (Jul. 24, 2008, 4:54
PM), http://archive.fortune.com/2008/07/24/technology/qualcomm-royalty.fortne/index.htm
[https://perma.cc/NT7R-AZYR] (“Analysts estimate the new deal with Nokia trims that
royalty rate in half to 2% or lower. . . For more than a decade, the San Diego-based tech giant
has successfully leveraged its claims to some basic technology in wireless networks and
phones into lucrative licensing deal. . . [P]hone makers have to shell out an estimated 4.5%
payment to Qualcomm for each phone sold.)
136. Press Release, Korea Fair Trade Comm., Qualcomm’s Abuse of Market Dominance
3 (Jul. 23, 2009) http://www.ftc.go.kr/eng/bbs.do?command=getList&type_cd=52&pag
eId=0305 [https://perma.cc/4RFX-YNQR].
137. See MRFTA, supra note 87 and accompanying text; Lee, supra note 132, at 9;
MRFTA, Act No. 3320, Dec. 31, 1980, art. 3-2, 23 (S. Kor.).
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Articles’ standards for unreasonableness, unfairness, discrimination, and
considerable harm, the KFTC cited a battery of the U.S. case law and analytic
tests used in the U.S. and EU courts. The agency conceded “intense debate”
over loyalty rebates138 and noted clashes even between the DOJ and the
FTC.139 A Seoul industry watcher had earlier observed that “[c]ompanies
here have constantly complained about Qualcomm demanding too much
royalty . . . The investigation can be seen as political pressure on Qualcomm
to be more friendly [sic] toward South Korean companies which use its
technology.”140 In retrospect, a U.S.-based observer was harsher in his
assessment that the KFTC had “run amok in recent years, slapping spurious
charges on foreign companies as it attempts to execute a protectionist
agenda,” naming Qualcomm among a list of foreign targets for Korean
regulator bias that included Apple, Google, Microsoft, and Intel.141
Prior to its record Qualcomm judgment, the KFTC fined Intel $25.4
million in June 2008 for rebate incentive schemes offered to Samsung and
other South Korean PC manufacturers as far back as 2001 in exchange for
their agreement not to purchase from Intel’s rival Advanced Micro Devices

138. Lee, supra note 132, at 16 (The Le[P]age case is the most recent among others
involving multi-product bundled rebate[s] and was subject to a fierce dispute. The Third
Circuit Court’s decision in favor of the plaintiff is still under intense debate. The court’s
decision was criticized for being based on insufficient evidences and unclear justifications on
the undermining competition as well as neglecting the price-cost safe harbor for assessing
illegality of price discounts, which had been established as [an] appropriate pricing test since
Brooke.)
139. Id. at 17 (“In the Single Firm Conduct Report released in September 2008, the DOJ
placed a focus on whether exclusive dealing contributes to maintaining monopoly, and, if so,
it stated, such excusive (sic) conduct could be regulated only if its harm greatly outweighed
the consumer benefits. It also said exclusive dealing affecting less than a 30% market share
was considered to be in safe harbor. It took a similar approach to bundled discount[s].
According to the report, bundled discounting should only be condemned based on
consideration of, among others, whether rivals remain or are likely to remain in the market,
or anticompetitive effects from bundled discount[s] are substantially disproportionate to the
benefits. When it comes to single-product loyalty rebates, it cast a doubt on the concept of
contestability or measurement of efficient scale, and concluded that it would be appropriate
to apply the predator pricing approach to single-product loyalty discounts. In response to the
DOJ Report, FTC Commissioners Harbour, Leibowitz and Rosch strongly criticized [it
because] the focus on the price-cost safe harbor and whether rivals remain in a market could
inhibit rival companies from securing the ‘minimum viable scale,’ leaving unchecked the
abuse of monopoly power by a monopolist. In May 2009, the DOJ withdrew the report.”)
140. Choe Sang-Hun, Qualcomm Under Scrutiny by Korean Antitrust Agency, THE NEW
YORK TIMES, Jan. 3, 2007, at C4.
141. Roger Kay, South Korea at a Crossroads, FORBES (June 2, 2015, 9:30 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/rogerkay/2015/06/22/south-korea-at-a-crossroads
[https://perma.cc/UN65-FVHG] (noting that “[a]n increasing proportion of these decisions
have been overturned in South Korean courts, an independent judiciary that has tended to
weigh cases on their merits.”).
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(“AMD”).142 Such a “time-honored” practice within the industry143 did not
dissuade the KFTC from turning to its MRFTA Article 3-2 canvas and to a
linked Presidential Decree. The agency asserted that Intel had violated
Article 3-2 by unfairly excluding competitive enterprisers or doing
considerable harm to the interest of consumers,144 previewing its approach to
be used a year later against Qualcomm. With Intel, the KFTC went a step
further and also cited a related Presidential Decree clause which describes
one manner of competitor exclusion as a situation “[w]here the business is
done on the condition that business partners do not trade with business
rivals.”145 Intel, for its part, argued that the rebates did not violate the spirit
of the preceding clause (“[w]here goods or services supplied at lower prices
than normally trading prices or goods or services purchased at higher prices
than normally trading prices are feared to put business rivals out of the
business”)146; according to its submitted economic methodology, an effective
price test using a commercially viable share (“CVS”), the rebates had not
resulted in unreasonably low prices due to effective price being significantly
higher than the average cost.147 In response, the KFTC determined that
competitor exclusion could transpire if certain assumptions in Intel’s
methodology were tweaked—specifically, the percentages for CVS and the
non-conditional rebate rate.148 An official summary of the decision did
contain the following caveat:
Internationally, the U.S. takes a relatively generous position about
loyalty rebate although different from one court to another. The EU and

142. For an English-language official summary of the KFTC decision, see KFTC,
DECISION NO. 2008-295, INTEL’S ABUSE OF DOMINANCE (2008) http://www.ftc.go.kr/eng/bbs.
do?command=getList&type_cd=54&pageId=0302
[https://perma.cc/32QR-QRVM]
(discussing a case involving Intel’s exclusive dealing as illustrated by the company’s loyalty
rebates and analyzing the commission’s decision on the case).
143. Shu-Ching Jean Chen, Korean Watchdog Says Intel Doesn’t Play Fair, FORBES (June
5, 2008, 12:04 PM), http://www.forbes.com/2008/06/05/intel-korea-antitrust-markets-equitycx_jc_0605markets03.html [https://perma.cc/7XWL-543E].
144. KFTC, supra note 142, at 6.
145. Enforcement Decree of the MRFTA, Presidential Decree No. 12979, Apr. 14, 1990,
art. 5-5(2) (S. Kor.).
146. Id. at art. 5-5(1).
147. KFTC, DECISION NO. 2008-295, INTEL’S ABUSE OF MARKET DOMINANCE IN KOREA,
translated by Byung-Geon Lee, American Antitrust Institute, 2009, http://www.antit
rustinstitute.org/files/aai-%20Intel%20KFTC%20summary%203-12-09_031220091229.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MSW6-MFCC].
148. Id. For a closer look at the effective price test using a commercially viable share, see
GUNNAR NIELS ET. AL., ECONOMICS FOR COMPETITION LAWYERS 233-234 (2d ed. 2011) (“as
efficient competitor analysis in Intel shows both the strengths and weaknesses of this test in
loyalty rebates—it has the advantage of generating clear thresholds according to a specified
formula, but the disadvantage is that the numbers cannot be relied upon unless you are
comfortable with the assumptions behind them.”).
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Korea are rather strict. Japan has no surcharge provisions on the relevant
violation and imposes relatively lenient corrective measures. Given this, the
court’s ruling on this Case will have the great significance as a precedent.149
However, even in the EU, the legal debate over Intel’s rebates has
dragged on. As recently as October 2016, EU Advocate General Nils Wahl
rebuked a European General Court for failing to establish an anticompetitive
foreclosure effect.150
With respect to the rebates, the KFTC proved to be an outlier. Having
recognized that the MRFTA is “silent on the criteria for determining the
unreasonableness of exclusive dealing,”151 the agency under the Lee
administration deferentially exercised its discretion in line with Seoul’s overarching economic policy of the period. Partiality towards domestic
companies over their competitors necessitated a divergent legal stance, and
the Korean competition regime could do little but oblige.
CONCLUSION
National antitrust silos are not a novel phenomenon. Former European
Commissioner for Competition Joaquín Almunia warned of them years
ago,152 and scholarship touching upon the furtherance of nationalist goals by
149. KFTC, supra note 142, at 16.
150. Court of Justice of the European Union Press Release No 114/16, Advocate General
Wahl considers that Intel’s appeal against the imposition of a €1.06 billion fine for abuse of
its dominant position should be upheld (Oct. 20, 2016), http://curia.europa.eu/j
cms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2016-10/cp160114en.pdf [https://perma.cc/6LHT-2CMK].
The press release continued to state:
[t]he Advocate General therefore concludes that the General Court erred in
finding that ‘exclusivity rebates’ constitute a separate and unique category of
rebates that require no consideration of all the circumstances in order to establish
an abuse of dominant position. In addition, the Advocate General goes on to
determine that the General Court erred in law in its alternative assessment of
capability by failing to establish, on the basis of all the circumstances, that the
rebates and payments offered by the appellant had, in all likelihood, an anticompetitive foreclosure effect.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
151. KFTC, supra note 142, at 7.
152. Almunia, supra note 3. Almunia went on to state:
[f]rom our perspective as enforcers: we need to be able to bring cases which
involve companies and behaviours that cut across multiple jurisdictions. This
requires practical cooperation between our agencies but also a degree of
convergence between our policies. And it is also true from the perspective of
businesses: cooperation and convergence contribute to a level playing field across
jurisdictions, increase legal predictability by reducing the risk of incoherent
intervention, and ultimately facilitate cross-border trade and investments to the
benefit of our economies. Of course, we all necessarily operate in the context of
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various antitrust agencies dates back decades.153 However, a creeping loss
of public confidence in open markets—coupled with the obstacles to
coherent global antitrust enforcement that bear the FTC Act’s influence, as
illustrated in this Article—risks amplifying the problem. As anti-free trade
agendas continue to garner more mainstream popularity for formerly
counter-establishment parties, a proliferation of protectionist silos could
tempt even governments that, for the most part, had moved past them. Why,
American officials may ask, should the U.S. continue championing the
liberal international economic order when an illiberal China or an ostensibly
liberal South Korea bends regulatory rules to disadvantage American
companies, workers, and consumers? Skepticism towards a liberal
democratic “end of history”154 in general, and failures of economic liberalism
in particular, are threatening to motivate political circles accordingly. Even
perennial norms and conventions of the U.S. competition regime which
evolved to safeguard regulator independence at home are no longer above
disruption; the ambiguous statutory articulations that carried over abroad to
empower strong executives are likewise playing a paper tiger role
domestically of late.155
Protectionist policies designed to compromise market competition—for
all its documented excesses and inadequacies—would sap its creative vitality

our own market conditions, our own competition laws and our own procedures.
The parameters of our cooperation are defined by this fact. In terms of substantive
assessment, we have to recognise that each case is necessarily shaped by these
specificities — but this should not stop us working towards common principles,
built upon a sound economic analysis.
Id.
153. See, e.g., Cushman, supra note 16 (discussing the impact of presidential policies on
agencies in a 1941 publication);
[U]pon examining the policies behind the antitrust laws of South Korea and Japan
and looking at the overall state of the economy of these countries since the
enactment of their antitrust laws, one would be hard pressed not to acknowledge
that they have also been successful. Their success, however, has not been in the
form of implementing their antitrust measures. Rather, it has been in achieving
the objectives behind their antitrust laws—the growth of their economies.
Abir, supra note 31, at 175.
154. Contrary to popular belief, Francis Fukuyama’s thesis did not imply a world free of
conflict. See Francis Fukuyama, The End of History, 16 NATIONAL INTEREST 1, 3-18 (1989)
(arguing that the passing of Marxism-Leninism worldwide would lead to a disappearance of
ideological struggles and a decline of large-scale conflicts between states).
155. See, e.g., Josh Boak, Trump’s CEO meetings raise ethics questions, ASSOCIATED
PRESS (Jan. 14, 2017), https://www.apnews.com/7d256125f53643fbb20e4be2bc993a2b
[https://perma.cc/C94Q-YME9] (reporting that Trump’s meetings with CEOs regarding the
potential mergers of their companies demonstrate a compromised position of the
administration’s regulatory agency).
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and the concurrent liberal peace156 often taken for granted. Economic
liberalism ails not so much from the intrinsic failings of core tenets, but from
their more egregious nation-state and corporate violators. Proposals for
greater accountability and harmonization have ranged from presumption of
an underlying coordination scheme in antitrust investigations of a culpable
country’s companies,157 to an international competition regime binding on
member states in at least some areas of antitrust.158 Each has associated costs,
but their very debate harnesses polycentric dialogue lacking in nationalist
regulatory agendas and calls for “our country, right or wrong” protectionist
silos. It should be emphasized to policymakers and politicians collectively
that lasting convergence in antitrust enforcement is unachievable without
global coherence in regulator autonomy, and the FTC Act’s formative
influence is not above scrutiny or reproach. Still-elusive realization of the
liberal economic international order’s intended form will require an
expanded constellation of independent competition regulators empowered to
enforce antitrust laws consistently.

156. Doyle’s characterization of Schumpeter’s philosophy is insightful here.
According to Schumpeter (1955:68), when the people’s energies are daily
absorbed in production, ‘economic rationalism,’ or the instability of market
competition, necessitates calculation. It also ‘individualizes’ as ‘subjective
opportunities’ replace the ‘immutable factors’ of traditional hierarchical society.
Rational individuals then demand democratic governance . . . Democratic
capitalism means free trade and a peaceful foreign policy simply because they
are, Schumpeter claimed, the first best solutions for rational majorities in
capitalist societies. This is the heart of the contemporary enthusiasm, expressed
by many liberal politicians, for global democratization and capitalism as the
inevitable and pacific routes to peace . . .
Doyle, supra note 20, at 67.
157. See generally Nicolas Petit, Chinese State Capitalism and Western Antitrust Policy,
4 CONCURRENCES 69 (2016) (arguing that China’s state-led economic organization facilitates
antitrust problems).
158. See generally John O. McGinnis, The Political Economy of International Antitrust
Harmonization, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 549 (2003) (criticizing harmonization of
international antitrust laws and arguing for diversification and decentralization as an
alternative).

